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Among the most pressing problems confronting contemporary, 
liberal democracies is that of forging out of a highly diverse popu-
lation apolitical association of citizens sufficiently bound together 
by both shared political values and affective ties of social solidar-
ity. The assimilationist policies of the past were aimed at creating 
an association of identical citizens for whom racial, ethnic, na-
tional and other group-based differences no longer made any dif-
ference. These policies are no longer politically feasible and, in 
any case, were probably never politically justifiable. Consequently, 
the movement over recent decades has been in the direction of 
accommodationist policies. Yet accommodationist policies gener-
ally pose their own risks. The demands of both justice and social 
stability impose limits on the range of character traits, disposi-
tions, social roles and ways of life a liberal state can tolerate. 
One standard way of reducing, if not resolving, this tension 
between assimilationist and accommodationist pressures in plu-
ralist liberal democracies is to draw attention to the distinction 
between the state and civil society. Because the state is a 
nonvoluntary association, all are entitled to a state governed by 
liberal norms of nondiscrimination, tolerance, equality, mutual re-
spect and the like. But the various associations of civil society are 
voluntary insofar as individuals are free to exit any particular as-
sociation at their pleasure. Thus, the standard argument goes, the 
liberal norms of nondiscrimination, tolerance, equality, mutual re-
spect and the like need not extend to the voluntary associations 
constitutive of civil society. 
This argument, of course, must be rejected. The broad institu-
tional arrangements of civil society exert just as powerful an influ-
ence on the life prospects and self-development of individuals as 
those of the state. Thus, liberal ideals must extend to some signifi-
cant degree to civil society as well. This, however, exacerbates 
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the tension between the assimilationist and accommodationist pres-
sures on contemporary liberal democracies. The intrusion of lib-
eral ideals into civil society inevitably undermines the ability of 
many particularist groups racial, ethnic, national or otherwise 
to sustain themselves, since their survival often depends on infor-
mal modes of discrimination and exclusion within civil society. It 
should come as no surprise then that the extension of liberal ideals 
into civil society beyond the formal boundaries of the state has 
raised new demands for accommodation by various particularist 
groups: Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, the Amish, Hasidic 
Jews and others. 
The fundamental issue here is one of drawing boundaries. What 
may liberal democratic states properly require and expect of citi-
zens who already are, and probably will always already be, mem-
bers of particularist groups of a racial, ethnic, national or other 
sort. And what may such citizens require and expect of a liberal 
democratic state? It is this pressing problem that Jeff Spinner takes 
on in this book. 
Spinner argues that individual identity is the product of a dia-
lectical exchange between internally generated, individual choices 
and an externally imposed, social context. Race, ethnicity and 
nationality are problematic from a liberal point of view because all 
generally function as externally imposed elements of the social 
context within which persons make choices and acquire a particu-
lar individual identity. This is most obvious in the case of racial 
identity, since paradigmatically racial identity is imposed by one 
group on another. In contrast, groups often self-impose ethnic or 
national identities. Still, neither ethnic nor national identity is a 
matter of individual choice. Even if groups often self-impose eth-
nic or national identities, from the point of view of individual mem-
bers of such groups, their ethnic or national identity is still typi-
cally an unchosen given. 
Race, ethnicity and nationality, then, all pose a problem for 
liberalism, since liberalism aims at securing for all the social con-
ditions necessary to live self-reflective, self-interpreting autono-
mous lives. Liberalism does not require a social order within which 
individuals do not self-identify along racial, ethnic, national or other 
group-based lines. But it does require a social order in which they 
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do not do so unreflectively, automatically and without options. The 
liberal ideal of universal citizenship, complete with rights to non-
discrimination, tolerance and the like, insures for each citizen a 
public identity independent of his or her racial, ethnic, national or 
other group-based identity. But Spinner notes, citing Marx in On 
the Jewish Question, this liberal emancipation of the citizen from 
racial, ethnic, national, religious and other constraints is only par-
tial, for within civil society, citizens will remain constrained and 
divided involuntarily along racial, ethnic, national, religious and 
similar lines. The emancipatory project initiated with the intro-
duction of liberal citizenship ideals in England, France, the United 
States and elsewhere demands, then, a reordering of civil society 
along liberal lines. 
There is here, of course, a great danger: namely, that of the 
thoroughly homogenous, oppressive, totalitarian liberal state. A 
genuinely liberal state is a free and open state within which many 
diverse social groups and ways of life flourish. It is a state with a 
heterogenous and lively civil society comprised of active, flour-
ishing churches, corporations, artistic societies, advocacy groups, 
neighborhood associations, clubs and the like. But such a civil 
society is not possible unless various social groups are able to de-
fine themselves according to their own values and exclude those 
who do not, in their judgment, belong. So, for example, a liberal 
state must permit illiberal churches to exist, even flourish, not-
withstanding the fact that they reject and violate internally liberal 
ideals of nondiscrimination and tolerance. 
Still, a liberal state must insure that liberal ideals extend sig-
nificantly to important aspects of civil society: e.g., labor, capital 
and housing markets, education, and the like. To determine how 
far liberal ideals must extend to civil society, Spinner argues we 
must answer two questions: First, which institutions within civil 
society are essential to full citizenship? Second, which institu-
tions within civil society can incorporate liberal ideals and still 
survive to serve their basic purpose? On Spinner s view, if we 
think about these two questions we will see that a liberal state must 
extend liberal ideals of nondiscrimination, tolerance, equality and 
the like to labor, capital and housing markets, and to education 
(which must be compulsory and informed by liberal democratic 
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political ideals). We will also see, on Spinner s view, that a liberal 
state ought not demand that these ideals be honored by all churches 
or voluntary political associations. A liberal state ought not toler-
ate discrimination within the workplace or lending institution, but 
it ought to tolerate (but not encourage) it within the church or po-
litical party. Of course, in the ideal, there will be few if any illib-
eral associations within civil society in a liberal state. But this is 
an ideal compliance with which a liberal state cannot require, but 
only gently encourage. 
Nevertheless, a liberal state will prevent citizens from acting 
in many ways for reasons of ethnic identification and will thus 
undermine ethnic identifications. Most ethnic groups (e.g., Irish 
and Italian Americans) will simply assimilate to the larger liberal 
culture, with individual group members retaining voluntarily only 
a weak sense of ethnic identity. Some ethnic groups (e.g., some 
Native Americans, the Amish or Hasidic Jews), however, will re-
sist the larger liberal culture and seek to withdraw from it so as to 
insure that group-members are reared into a strong ethnic identity 
and carry forward the group s self-understanding and way of life. 
Such groups raise fundamental difficulties for a liberal state: Should 
a liberal state encourage such groups not to withdraw from the 
larger liberal culture? Should the members of such groups be ex-
cused from the sort of compulsory education citizenship requires, 
or from nondiscrimination rules in the workplace? Spinner sug-
gests that a liberal state ought to encourage such groups not to 
withdraw from the larger liberal culture, but that groups that choose 
to so withdraw ought to be accommodated if their withdrawal is 
significant and poses no threat to the justice or stability of a liberal 
democratic state. For example, most Amish groups are more or 
less fully withdrawn from the shared social and political life of 
citizens generally. Moreover, tolerating the Amish among us and 
excusing them from the demands of compulsory education or non-
discrimination within the workplace does not threaten the justice 
or stability of our liberal democracy, provided group members are 
not denied meaningful exit options. So, after a discussion of Wis-
consin v. Yoder, Spinner concludes that the case for tolerating the 
Amish, at least with respect to compulsory education and the like, 
is strong. 
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As perhaps is already evident, Spinner argues throughout this 
book for a middle path between the assimilationist policies of the 
past and the more radical and thorough-going accommodationist 
policies and identity politics in vogue among self-professed 
multiculturalists. Like many multiculturalists Spinner rejects the 
assimilationist policies of the past and recognizes the pain they 
caused to many. But unlike most multiculturalists, Spinner argues 
that pain is not itself a reason per se for abandoning assimilationist 
policies. Most immigrants, at least, would likely have suffered 
pain upon moving to the United States, independent of any 
assimilationist policies, for the simple reason that cultures do not 
move the way people do. You cannot have Hungarian culture in 
the desert southwest everything is dif ferent: available foods, 
weather, the land, feasible housing, and the like. To pretend other-
wise in the hope of sustaining some sense of belonging to one s 
indigenous culture or homeland is futile. If immigrants are to 
achieve any sense of real belonging to a political community, they 
must assimilate to some significant degree. Spinner ultimately re-
jects the assimilationist policies of the past, then, not because they 
aimed at assimilation to a liberal political order and culture, but 
because they aimed at assimilation to a pre-ordained and non-ne-
gotiable conception of a homogenous civil society within which 
ethnic and other group-based forms of identity, even when self-
reflectiVely affirmed and chosen, were to be fully erased, at least 
for those who were not WASP s. For roughly parallel reasons Spin-
ner rejects much of the more radical agenda of multiculturalism 
and identity politics. More specifically, he rejects any conception 
of liberal politics within which ethnic groups enter politics solely 
to advance their own group-based interests and with arguments 
addressed only to their own group-based self-understanding. Lib-
eral states require, at a minimum, that diverse citizens be assimi-
lated to shared political traditions and values within which public 
debates over the common good may be framed. 
Of course, what is true of ethnic groups, especially in the United 
States, is not necessarily true of racial groups. As Spinner rightly 
notes, the history of racism in the United States makes it difficult 
to draw any direct inferences about the proper place of racial iden-
tity in the United States from claims about the proper place of 
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ethnic identity in a liberal state. Unlike ethnic identities, racial 
identity in the United States, at least for Blacks, has always been 
imposed fully from the outside, and has been so imposed within a 
context of deep social oppression and inequality. The challenge 
for a liberal state, like the United States, with a history of racism, 
then, is to find a way to accord Blacks full citizenship without 
reifying and institutionally reproducing a fixed Black identity. Ide-
ally, there should be no difference between racial and ethnic iden-
tity in a liberal state: both may exist, provided they arise through 
the self-reflective choices of individuals interacting as free equals 
with a larger liberal political culture and a heterogenous civil soci-
ety. The task facing the United States, then, is to find a way to 
enable Blacks, who were only recently accorded full formal citi-
zenship, to understand and experience themselves in daily life as 
full citizens. For it is only with that experience that Blacks will 
find themselves able critically and reflectively to assess Black ra-
cial identity, choosing individually whether and what parts of it to 
retain for themselves. 
Toward this end, Spinner argues for Black colleges and volun-
tary associations, and for their public support. His hope is that 
within such institutions, Blacks will acquire the sorts of experi-
ences needed to enter the larger public culture, not merely for-
mally but substantively, as full citizens. If Blacks are ever to de-
termine for themselves what it means, if anything, to be Black, 
they must first find their way to a meaningful political and social 
equality with Whites as fellow citizens, free and equal. Spinner 
acknowledges that public support for all Black colleges and other 
institutions may simply encourage a Black separatism at odds with 
liberal ideals. But he argues that ultimately poverty and the ongo-
ing substantive exclusion of Blacks from public and political life 
pose far greater threats to political stability than any temporary 
affirmation of a separatist Black identity. 
Nationalist identifications present yet another challenge to lib-
eral states. Nationalists regard the nation as a sort of organic en-
tity, marked in part by a unique culture, the survival of which de-
pends on political control of some well-defined territory. There 
are many reasons why liberals ought to reject any blanket nation-
alist principle. For one, there are simply too many nations for each 
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to have full control over its own territory. Moreover, there are 
virtually no significant habitable areas of territory left on Earth not 
already inhabited by a heterogenous population. Still, nationalists 
movements are often emancipatory (e.g., the American Indian 
Movement, the Armenian struggle) and liberals ought to support 
them when they are. The difficulty is determining how to distin-
guish in principle between emancipatory nationalist movements 
and those that are oppressive (e.g., Milosovic in Yugoslavia). On 
this issue, Spinner does not provide much guidance, except to ar-
gue in favor of a middle ground which neither rejects nationalist 
movements tout court nor suggests that liberals ought to support 
any and every genuinely nationalist movement. In the end, Spin-
ner maintains, liberals ought to support nationalist movements only 
to the extent that they are likely to advance the cause of liberal 
justice in a postnationalist global order within which most states 
are multination states. 
In the end, then, Spinner s view fits squarely in the liberal tra-
dition. It s fully compatible with (although in certain respects more 
fully developed than) the view defended by John Rawls in Politi-
cal Liberalism (Columbia U.R, 1993; revised paperback 1996) or 
Will Kymlicka in Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford U.R, 
1989). Unhappily, it s also open to some of the same challenges 
and objections, several of which Spinner either does not address 
or does not address effectively. The first concerns the problem of 
social unity and stability in a liberal democracy. Like Kymlicka 
and Rawls, Spinner assumes that the stability and unity of a liberal 
democracy is to be found in or cultivated through the shared val-
ues and affective ties constitutive of the common bond of citizen-
ship. Yet he never really explains how those values and ties are to 
be socially reproduced from one generation to another without vio-
lating liberal ideals. To be sure, he endorses and discusses com-
pulsory education. But he does not explain how a regime of com-
pulsory, state-directed education can do the work required of it 
without violating liberal ideals. This pressing issue has, happily, 
been recently addressed by Eammon Callan in his fine book, Cre-
ating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy (Ox-
ford U.P., 1997). 
BOOK REVIEWS 99 
A second and related difficulty concerns the family within lib-
eral states. Liberals, of course, have good reason to protect the 
family as a zone of private intimacy from excessive state intrusion. 
Yet, the family is the first and in some cases most influential of 
social forces shaping the character of future citizens. Thus, among 
institutions within civil society, the family stands out as in need of 
liberalization if liberal ideals are to be realized for all. This raises 
a key difficulty: How is the family to survive as a zone of private 
intimacy while being forcibly brought into line with liberal ideals? 
The point here is not that families which voluntarily honor liberal 
ideals cannot function as meaningful zones of private intimacy. 
The point is rather that at present many families are structured 
along illiberal lines rooted in ethnic or religious traditions and self-
understandings, and it is hard to see how such families are to be 
transformed through state intervention without violating traditional 
liberal commitments regarding limited government, familial pri-
vacy, and the like. 
A third difficulty with Spinner s work concerns the on-going 
debates over liberal nationalism. Charles Taylor, David Miller and 
others have argued with some plausibility that modem liberal states 
are unlikely to survive as multination states because such states 
demand of citizens that which citizens are likely to provide one 
another only if they affectively identify in strong ways with one 
another. If Taylor, Miller and others are right about this, then lib-
eral states have a reason both to adopt fairly strong assimilationist 
policies, and to limit immigration to persons likely to be recog-
nized by present citizens as one of us. Spinner fails to address 
this argument head on, although he clearly rejects the conclusion 
in favor of affirming multinational states within which citizens are 
bound to one another by shared political values and loyalties. Again, 
however, the challenge is to explain how a liberal state is to achieve 
unity and stability in this way without making use of the sort of 
sentimental nationalist or patriotic assimilationist programs Spin-
ner presumably rejects. 
A final objection Spinner s work invites and does not address 
concerns the problem of oppression. Spinner recognizes this prob-
lem in his discussion of racial identity and Black oppression in the 
United States. And while Spinner is more sensitive than many 
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liberal theorists to the group-based nature of racial and other forms 
of oppression in the United States, he assumes without establish-
ing that all that is needed to end the oppression of Blacks (and, 
presumably, other cases of group-based oppression) is to insure 
that Blacks (and other victims of oppression) substantively enjoy 
the same individual rights as Whites (and other non-oppressed per-
sons). Yet as Iris Young, Larry May and many others have argued, 
there are good reasons to think that in order to eliminate group-
based forms of oppression liberal democratic states will have to 
recognize group-differentiated rights. Of course, the recognition 
of such rights problematizes the traditional liberal conception of 
citizenship for the traditional conception is univocal in that dif-
ferent persons are rendered all the same for political purposes 
through their citizenship status. And, at the end of the day, Spinner s 
is a traditional conception of citizenship. 
This is a well-written, well-argued, and not yet dated, book 
that deserves to be read by all those, philosophers, political scien-
tists, law professors and the like, working in contemporary liberal 
theory or engaged in the on-going debates over citizenship, 
multicultural ism and social stability. I recommend it highly. 
